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Monday, October 7, 2024

MEDIA MONDAY / GAZA WAR YEAR ONE WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED

 

A resident walks amid the devastation following an overnight Israeli airstrike that targeted the neighborhood of Haret Hreik in Beirut's southern suburbs on October 3, 2024 (Photo by AFP) (Photo by -/AFP via Getty Images). 

GUEST ESSAY / By Michael Froman, President of the Council on Foreign Relations--Today marks one year since thousands of Hamas fighters breached the barrier separating Gaza from Israel and launched a deadly coordinated assault on Israel. The October 7 attack not only killed more than 1,000 Israelis (mostly civilians); it also upended Gaza, Israel, and the entire Middle East. For more on the changes of the past year—and what might happen next—I spoke with  Steven A. Cook, CFR’s Eni Enrico Mattei Senior Fellow for Middle East and Africa Studies, who recently returned from a week-long trip to Israel.   

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Mr. Froman
First some background music. Who is Michael Froman and what is CFR? Michael Froman is president of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). He previously served as vice chairman and president, strategic growth, at Mastercard, chairman of the Mastercard Center for Inclusive Growth, and a distinguished fellow at CFR.

 The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an American think tank specializing in U.S. foreign policy and international relations. Founded in 1921, it is an independent and nonpartisan 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization. CFR is based in New York City, with an additional office in Washington, D.C. Its membership has included senior politicians, secretaries of state, CIA directors, bankers, lawyers, professors, corporate directors, CEOs, and prominent media figures. 

 CFR meetings convene government officials, global business leaders, and prominent members of the intelligence and foreign-policy communities to discuss international issues. CFR publishes the bi-monthly journal Foreign Affairs since 1922. It also runs the David Rockefeller Studies Program, which makes recommendations to presidential administrations and the diplomatic community, testifies before Congress, interacts with the media, and publishes research on foreign policy issues. 

 Michael Froman is the organization's 15th president. 

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 Mr. Froman: "...Israel has now been at war in Gaza for nearly a year. Tens of thousands of Palestinian civilians have been killed, and yet victory hardly seems close at hand. What is the Israeli government’s strategy?   

The Israeli goal remains “the defeat of Hamas,” though Israeli leaders more likely mean “rendering Hamas unable to threaten Israel’s security.” From what I heard during my time in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, the Israelis believe they have realized or are close to realizing this aim. They have all but declared major combat operations over, and as I was departing, they began shifting military units to Israel’s northern border.   

 Israeli officials have said that Hamas fighters remain in Gaza, but they are a disorganized force. As a result, the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] will continue to fight there, hitting small groups of terrorists whenever they have the opportunity. Early in the conflict, Israeli officials declared that after major combat Israel would maintain “overall security control in Gaza.” That seems to be what is happening.   

 How about the Israeli public? What’s their attitude toward the war?    

The Israeli public is deeply divided. The hard right wants victory in Gaza, arguing that if the IDF does not win there, it will not win in the West Bank or Lebanon. By “win,” they mean defeating Hamas and Hezbollah. This is why the right has clearly pushed the government to prioritize the fight against Hamas over the fate of Israel’s remaining hostages.   

 This puts the right at odds with the mushy middle that analysts call “liberal Zionists,” which runs from left of center to right of center. This group deeply distrusts the government and would like to bring the conflict to an end. 

Anecdotally, members of this group seem to be in an internal struggle; they recognize that the hostages make Israel’s battle more difficult, but they also want the government to do everything possible to bring the hostages home, and they simply do not believe that Prime Minister Netanyahu has done that. 

 The left, for its part, fears that the government is slipping into fascism. It wants to end the war in Gaza and would like the government to fall. The problem is that leftists and liberal Zionists do not have a political program to achieve this goal. They are long on outrage, but short on strategy.  

 Q. Set the domestic political scene. How secure is Netanyahu’s position? And what’s the state of the opposition?  

Netanyahu’s coalition is stable, with a 68-seat majority after a number of Likud dissidents agreed to join the government. That will make it easier for the prime minister to weather the constant political threat from his right flank, which will brook no compromise in the fight with Hamas. 

Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir, for example, are both suspicious of any ceasefire, fearing it would effectively end the war, allowing Hamas to fight another day. 

As long as Netanyahu is careful not to cross this line, he seems safe.    

Q. While you were in Israel, the Houthis launched a missile near Tel Aviv, and the Israelis set off explosives in pagers used by Hezbollah members in Lebanon. The war in Gaza has escalated well beyond Gaza. Since you returned, Israel has sent ground forces into Lebanon, and Iran has again launched missiles at Israel. When you think about how the conflict could intensify and spread further, what worries you most?   

 Indeed, I slept through the air raid sirens when the Houthis attacked. That was my first morning in Israel. In rapid succession, Israel attacked Hezbollah with exploding pagers and walkie talkies, and then, when the group’s commanders met because they could not otherwise communicate, killed them in an airstrike. 

A week later, of course, Israel killed Hezbollah’s spiritual leader, Hassan Nasrallah. The Israeli escalation is clearly intended to intimidate Hezbollah (and its patron, Iran) and re-establish the deterrence it lost on October 7.      

 Certainly, Hezbollah is back on its heels, and it remains an open question whether it can muster an effective response to Israel, at least in the short run. My concerns are twofold. First, I worry that Israel's determination to launch a significant retaliatory strike against Iran will not deter Tehran, which may then order another round of (possibly larger) ballistic missile strikes on Israel. 

If that were to happen, it would be hard to control the spiral, and the Israel-Iran war that everyone has worried about will be upon us. This would likely draw the United States and others into the conflict. 

Second, I worry about the Israelis getting stuck in Lebanon. The Israelis are determined to change the rules of the game with Hezbollah and press their advantage. Fair enough, but if they go in on the ground, as they are poised to do, how do they get out?   

 We have seen this before: in the early 1980s, when Israel undertook Operation Peace for Galilee and drove all the way to Beirut. Israel ended up occupying a “security belt” in southern Lebanon between 1985 and 2000. About 250 Israeli soldiers were killed in those years. The difference between then and now is that the Israelis had help in the 1980s and 1990s from Lebanese Christian militias. Today, they would have no such allied help.  

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