Embarrassing Inaccurate Reporting and
punditry that escaped infamy
GUEST BLOG / By
Michael J. Socolow--NOBODY
KNEW ANYTHING at first. The attack happened far out in the Pacific, on a small
remote island. And the long shadow of time has erased much collective memory
about the first few hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor, 77 years ago today
on December 7, 1941.
For
the American media, that’s a good thing.
With
very limited access to verifiable information, newspaper and radio reporters
acted irresponsibly. Wild speculation
flooded the public sphere when radio transmissions from Hawaii were severely
constricted and Washington authorities deemed the full scope and extent of the
attack a state secret. The opportunity for accurate, verified and responsible
journalism evaporated.
A
look back at the reporting on Pearl Harbor shows how little has changed in the
way media covers—or doesn’t cover—major events, from a tendency for errors in
the early days of a crisis to its use of analysts and outside experts to fill
the void created by the lack of actual reporting. This void of information
catalyzes speculation and conjecture, and it’s here that journalism starts to
crumble. Close examination of any epochal breaking news story - Pearl Harbor,
the Kennedy assassination, 9/11 - reveals the same pattern.
Japanese planes never attacked San Francisco |
Across
CBS, NBC, and Mutual, the “experts” offered odd theories for how, and why, the
attack happened. Perhaps the nuttiest
was the assertion—by several commentators—that the Japanese were incapable of
such a ferocious assault. Numerous radio newscasters asserted that only one
nation on earth could have pulled off such a brilliant blitzkrieg: Nazi
Germany.
“It
is possible, my friends, that this is a coup engineered by German influence and
with the aid of German vessels in the Pacific,” said NBC News commentator Upton
Close—a specialist on the Far East—just 10 minutes after the last wave of
bombing ended on Oahu. “And again it is possible that this is a coup engineered
by a small portion of the Japanese navy that has gone fanatic,” he continued. A
third idea he proffered was that the attack was staged by the anti-war faction
in the Japanese government to discredit the pro-war faction by presumably
provoking the United States into destroying the Japanese military. “All these
things are possible,” he concluded. But none of them, of course, were true.
A
few hours later, CBS aired the commentary of Major George Fielding Elliot, a
syndicated columnist and military expert, who assured listeners that the Pearl
Harbor attack spelled doom for the Japanese Empire. “Japan is cornered, surrounded by forces
which she cannot hope to overcome and to which in the end she must succumb,” he
informed the listening public.
As
the day wore on, real reporting receded, giving way to more speculation.
Right-wing commentator Fulton Lewis Jr. told an audience five hours after the
attack that he shared the doubts of many American authorities that the Japanese
were truly responsible. He “reported” that US military officials weren’t
convinced Japanese pilots had the skills to carry out such an impressive raid.
The War Department, he said, is “concerned to find out who the pilots of these
planes are—whether they are Japanese pilots. There is some doubt as to that,
some skepticism whether they may be pilots of some other nationality, perhaps
Germans, perhaps Italians,” he explained. The rumor that Germans bombed Pearl
Harbor lingered on the airwaves, with NBC reporting, on December 8, that
eyewitnesses claimed to have seen Nazi swastikas painted on some of the
bombers.
Twenty
years later, scholar Ernest D. Rose carefully evaluated the first radio reports
about Pearl Harbor. His assessment was
brutal. “One can not escape the conclusion that in the overall pattern of radio
news communication that day something was drastically wrong,” he concluded.
“The bulk of radio news time was consumed by commentators and analysts trying
to explain the meaning of situations without access to reliable first-hand
information,” he explained. All the
inaccurate speculation failed to reassure or properly inform the public during
a time of national distress. The commentary, Rose said, seemed more intended to
prop up the credibility of the pundits than offer reliable information or
helpful context.
The
inaccurate news analysis would have a lasting impact. The rumor that the
Germans collaborated on—or even masterminded—the attack on Pearl Harbor carried
into early 1942. It was bolstered by conspiratorial talk in the aftermath of
Hitler’s unprovoked declaration of war on the United States on December 11,
1941. The following year, best-selling books by reporters who knew Nazi Germany
well (such as Harry Flannery’s Assignment to Berlin, and Pierre Huss’s The Foe
We Face) emphasized the complicity of Fritz Wiedemann, Hitler’s friend and the
German Consul General in San Francisco, until his expulsion in 1941, in the
attack. Wiedemann, a shadowy figure, had been Corporal Hitler’s superior in
World War I, and they remained lifelong trusted confidants. When he left San
Francisco, Wiedemann traveled to Japan and then China in the weeks before Pearl
Harbor, stoking suspicion. Even after the war ended, when the Joint
Congressional Committee investigating the attack on Pearl Harbor held its
hearings, suspicion about Wiedemann’s role reemerged.
The
American media did not distinguish itself in the immediate aftermath of
December 7, 1941. But time has let it off the hook. All the commentators
mentioned above went on to increased visibility and impressive careers during
the war. Americans then—and now—tend to be very forgiving of terrible punditry,
inaccurate reporting, and ridiculous commentary.
Perhaps
we shouldn’t be.
Article first
appeared in the Columbia Journalism Report, December 7, 2016.
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