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Painting depicts Union General John Buford leading an advanced guard of U.S. Calvary into Gettysburg, June 30, 1863. Historians conclude it was Buford’s ability to force the Rebels into battle at Gettysburg before General Robert E. Lee had all is troops in place. Forcing Lee to improvise on the run forced the South into many battle situations they were not accustomed to performing—for example fighting on the offensive instead of the defensive. All of the major Southern victories prior to Gettysburg were fought on the defensive. Painting by Mort Kunstler: military.org.ua
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PRELUDE TO THE BATTLE.
Editor’s note: Often overlooked by the casual reader, the month
and day before the Civil War Battle of Gettysburg (July 1-3, 1863), are also
filled with fascinating examples of intrigue and blunder. Utmost is an amazing decision by President
Abraham Lincoln to replace his top field General Joe Hooker on June 28 with
General George Meade. Two days later,
General Meade is faced with preparing to fight the Rebels on Federal/Pennsylvania
soil.
It was akin to Lincoln saying “...Thank you for accepting the
promotion and by the way here are the keys to hell.”
Let’s go back six weeks before Gettysburg.
GUEST BLOG—National Park Civil War Series [ www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_books/civil_war_series/16/sec2.htm#2
] -- Immediately after his victory at
Chancellorsville (Apr. 30 to May 6, 1863), General Robert E. Lee prepared the
Army of Northern Virginia for campaigns soon to come. He reorganized its
infantry into three corps of three divisions each and placed them under command
of Lieutenant Generals James Longstreet, Richard S. Ewell, and A. Powell Hill. (A
Confederate corps numbered about 20,000 infantrymen, 2,000 artillerymen; a
division 6,000 infantry men, and a brigade 1,500.) His cavalry division
remained under the command of Maj. Gen. James E. B. Stuart, and he allotted
supporting artillery battalions to each. The Army of Northern Virginia numbered
about 75,000 officers and men, nearly 10,000 of whom were cavalry.
After his defeat at Chancellorsville,
General Hooker's Army of the Potomac returned to its positions near
Fredericksburg and prepared for a new thrust toward Richmond. Lee retained the
initiative gained at Chancellorsville, however, and on June 6 launched an
ambitious campaign of his own. Because he could see nothing to be gained from
another battle in the Fredericksburg area, he decided on a bold move that would
transfer the scene of hostilities north of the Potomac River. If this could be
done, it might disrupt Federal campaign plans for the season, remove Federal
forces from the Shenandoah Valley, and give him a chance to win a decisive victory
for the Confederacy.
Leaving Hill's Corps to guard the
Rappahannock River's crossings at Fredericksburg, Lee moved Ewell's and
Longstreet's Corps west and north to the Culpeper area where much of Stuart's
cavalry had assembled for the march north. There on June 9, in obedience to
Hooker's order to "disperse and destroy" the Confederate force in
that area, the Cavalry Corpus of the Army of the Potomac surprised and nearly
defeated the Confederate horsemen in the battle of Brandy Station, the largest
cavalry battle of the war. The battle was a draw; the Federals rode from the
field, leaving Stuart to nurse his wounded pride. Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton,
commander of the Union cavalry, however, had confirmed that the Confederates
were in force in the Culpeper area, and the Union horsemen had learned that
they could "dispute the superiority hitherto claimed by, and conceded to
the Confederate cavalry."
On June 10 Ewell's Corps left Culpeper for
the Shenandoah Valley. Four days later it captured the Union garrison at
Winchester and a large amount of supplies there and at Martinsburg. Ewell's
Corps reached the Potomac near Hagerstown on June 15. As Ewell neared the
Potomac, Longstreet's Corps moved northeast of the Blue Ridge to the mountain
gaps west of Washington. There it and Stuart's cavalrymen guarded the
Confederate right and rear as the remainder of Lee's army moved north. In
mid-June also Hill's Corps marched from Fredericksburg toward Front Royal and
the Shenandoah Valley beyond. Lee's plan to remove the theater of operations
from Virginia was well under way.
General Hooker knew that Lee's army was
moving north but could not divine Lee's intentions or objectives. When it
became apparent that only Hill's Corps remained at Fredericksburg, Hooker
suggested that he be allowed to strike it and advance toward Richmond. Although
this suggestion had some merit at that time, Lincoln denied it, observing that
Lee's army was his "sure objective point." Therefore, Hooker shifted
the Army of the Potomac to the area west of Washington and south of the
Potomac, whence it could face Lee's main force and cover Washington. Hooker's
efforts to learn of Lee's army's locations west of Washington by sending
cavalry and infantry probes through the mountain gaps there resulted in lively
fights with Stuart's men at Aldie, Middleburg, and Upperville, but they
provided little information and did not seriously disrupt Lee's movements.
Ewell's Corps and Brigadier General Albert
G. Jenkins's brigade of cavalry crossed the Potomac on June 15 and headed north
up the Cumberland Valley to Hagerstown and Chambersburg in a giant raid,
sweeping the country for supplies. At Chambersburg, the one-legged Ewell
divided his force, sending Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early's division east to
Gettysburg, York, and the Susquehanna River beyond. In the meantime, Ewell
continued north to Carlisle and toward Harrisburg with the divisions of Maj.
Gens. Robert E. Rodes and Edward Johnson. On June 29 Early's troops reached the
Susquehanna River at Wrightsville, and Rodes's division threatened Harrisburg.
By this time the corps of Hill and Longstreet had crossed the Potomac on June
24th and 25th and reached the Chambersburg area on the 27th. They occupied
Chambersburg and Cashtown Pass over South Mountain to the east.
On June 25, on learning that Lee's forces
had crossed the Potomac, Hooker ordered the Army of the Potomac from Virginia
into that part of Maryland between Frederick and the river. In the meantime
other Federal commands in the threatened area girded to meet the Confederate
menace, and Governor Andrew Curtin of Pennsylvania worked to organize the
Pennsylvania militia to defend Harrisburg and other important points within the
Keystone State.
On June 3, 1863, the Army of Northern
Virginia begins moving west to cross the Blue Ridge Mountains and gain the
Shenandoah Valley. By the time General Hooker discerns Lee's purpose the
Confederate army has entered the valley and is moving north to cross the
Potomac and invade Maryland and Pennsylvania. The Union Army of the Potomac
withdraws from the line of the Rappahannock River and starts marching north to
intercept Lee's army.
After crossing the Potomac, Lee lost
contact with Stuart and much of the Confederate cavalry. He had instructed that
general to guard the mountain passes with part of his horsemen so long as the
enemy was south of the Potomac and to cross that river with the remainder in
order to screen Ewell's right. Stuart saw that his troopers guarded the passes,
but he attempted to reach Ewell's right, not by a direct route near the
mountains, but by leading his three best brigades between the Union army and
Washington. Stuart hoped that such a move would create havoc among the enemy
and remove the stain of Brandy Station from his reputation. But his gamble
failed; the Union forces moved and prevented his reaching Ewell's right. Thus,
the three errant brigades crossed the Potomac at Rowser's Ford and rode north
via Rockville, Westminster, and Hanover to Carlisle, completely out of touch
with General Lee and the main army and not providing the intelligence and
screening important to its success. Stuart's failure to cover the the right of
Lee's army and provide him with information on the enemy was one of the major
Confederate blunders of the Gettysburg Campaign.
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| Burning of the Wrightsville/Columbia Bridge over the Susquehanna River, June 28, 1863 |
Early on June 28, when the Army of the
Potomac was concentrated near Frederick, Maryland, a messenger from the War
Department arrived with an order relieving General Hooker from command of that
army and replacing him with Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, commander of the Union
Fifth Corps. Hooker had rashly offered his resignation on the 27th, and
President Lincoln accepted it with alacrity. Meade was thoroughly surprised at
his appointment and was reluctant to accept it. Few if any Americans have had so
much responsibility thrust upon them at such a critical time. Yet, Meade, a
thoroughly capable professional soldier who had a strong sense of duty,
shouldered the burden and took immediate measures to move his army north on a
broad front to the relief of Harrisburg while covering Washington and
Baltimore.
SITUATION JUNE 30, 1863, THE EVE OF BATTLE
On the evening of June 28 General Lee, who
was at Chambersburg, learned from a spy that the Army of the Potomac, now under
General Meade, had crossed the Potomac and was in the Frederick area. He
decided immediately to concentrate his army east of the mountains to hold the
Union army there and sent riders to General Ewell at Carlisle with orders to
return his corps at once to the Gettysburg-Cashtown area. Ewell, who was about
to attempt the capture of Harrisburg, called off that operation and ordered
General Early at York, Pennsylvania, to return his division to the assembly
area without delay. In the meantime, Ewell sent Johnson's division and his
wagon train back toward Chambersburg and started with Rodes's division on a
direct route toward Gettysburg.
The Army of Northern Virginia is attempting
to concentrate near Cashtown to prepare for battle. Only four of the army's
nine divisions are on the eastern side of the mountains. The Army of the
Potomac is moving north from Frederick along nearly a thirty-mile front.
Buford's Union cavalry division occupies Gettysburg during the afternoon, and
Reynolds's 1st Army Corps camps five miles south of the town. The remainder of
the army is gradually moving in the direction of Gettysburg.
On June 29 Maj. Gen. Henry Heth's division of Hill's Corps crossed South Mountain through Cashtown Pass to the hamlet of Cashtown at the east base of the mountain. On June 30 Heth sent a brigade east eight miles to Gettysburg in search of supplies, shoes especially, that he heard were in the town. When near Gettysburg, the Confederates saw a sizable force of Union cavalry and returned to Cashtown without having a fight. On July 1 General Hill sent Heth's division, followed by that of Maj. Gen. Dorsey Pender, to Gettysburg in a reconnaissance-in-force.
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| Brig. General John Buford Painting by Mort Kuntsler |
The troops seen near Gettysburg on June 30
were cavalrymen of Maj. Gen. John Buford's division of the Army of the Potomac.
As that army had moved north from the Frederick area, Buford's troopers
screened its left front, collecting information on Lee's army for General Meade
and for Maj. Gen. John E. Reynolds, commander of the Union First Corps. Buford,
an excellent cavalry officer, had reached Gettysburg with two of his three
brigades. He posted them in an arc west and north of the town covering the
roads over which the Confederates might approach.
Gettysburg in 1863 was a town of about
2,400 people. It sat amid gently rolling farmland—a bucolic quilt of orchards,
grain fields, pastures, and wood lots. Its landscape undulated between low
north-south ridges sometimes connected to lone granite hills, and Rock Creek
bordered the town on the east. Gettysburg was the county seat of Adams County,
and it could boast having Pennsylvania College and a Lutheran seminary. In
addition, it was the hub of a road network with turnpikes leading west to
Chambersburg, east to York, and southeast to Baltimore. Eight other roads led
to Harrisburg, Carlisle, Emmitsburg, Taneytown, Hagerstown, Hanover, and lesser
places nearby. A railroad stretched east to Hanover Junction and to Baltimore
beyond. A railroad bed had been constructed near the Chambersburg Pike west of
the town, but it had no tracks.
The Army of the Potomac numbered about
95,000 officers and enlisted personnel, all volunteers. It had seven corps of
infantry and artillery, a corps of cavalry and artillery, and an artillery
reserve of twenty-one batteries. Its corps were significantly smaller than
Confederate corps and averaged 14,000 officers and enlisted men each but ranged
in size from 9,800 to 17,000. There were twenty-two divisions, two or three per
corps, divided into fifty-nine brigades. The infantry brigades were comparable
in size to Confederate brigades, having an average strength of about 1,500
officers and men. Union divisions, however, were usually smaller than those of
the Army of Northern Virginia.
Meade's army had marched north from
Frederick on a broad front, searching for the Confederates and covering
Baltimore and Washington. On June 30 the left of Meade's army was near
Emmitsburg, Maryland, and its right about 25 miles to the east near Manchester.
As Lee ordered a concentration near Gettysburg, Meade prepared to set up a
defensive position along Pipe Creek just south of the Mason-Dixon line. The
events of July 1 were to change each commander's plans.
BUFORD IN BATTLE, JULY 1, 1863.
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| This is the official print for the 1990 Class of the U.S. Army War College by renown Civil War artist Mort Kunstler. |
Above, we see General Buford, dismounted, holding
binoculars and pointing to the Confederate forces on the other side of
Willoughby's Run. General Reynolds peers through his binoculars to see the
enemy, through the smoke and dust. the action takes place McPherson's ridge at
the site of the monuments to General Buford and Reynolds, McPherson's barn,
still in existence, is seen in the right background. Two artillery pieces are
seen, both 3" Ordinance Rifles, part of Calef's Battery A, 2nd U.S.
Artillery. They were positioned at this site and are there to this day. The
"worm" fence on the north side of the Chambersburg Pike has been torn
down at this point to prepare the ridge for the strong defense that followed.
In the background, a shell bursts near one of the horse holders of the
dismounted cavalry, as they are being led to a safer area behind the ridge.
General Buford, casual in his field
appearance (note the unbuttoned top button of his four button sack coat) has
his ever present pipe protruding from his chest pocket. His headquarters flag,
carried by the mounted corporal immediately behind him, with the two number
ones in block lettering (1st Brigade, 1st Division) was the standard
headquarters flag adopted for the Cavalry Corps in early 1863. His horse is
held by the dismounted sergeant, immediately below his outstretched arm.
General Reynolds, on his black charger, has
a Western style saddle, which still exists in the J. Norward Wirt Collection at
the Mollus Museum in Philadelphia, and has a brace of pistols in horse holsters
attached to the saddle. His uniform is regulation dress for General officers,
with the buttons grouped in threes, and a velvet collar and cuffs. Directly
behind him flies his headquarters flag, as illustrated in Headquarters Flags,
American Military Equipage Vol. II. A fragment of the actual flag is also in
the Mollus Museum in Philadelphia. The cavalry escort for General Reynolds was
Company "L" of the 1st Maine Cavalry. Their guidon flies between the
two headquarters flags. The other flag in the painting is the artillery guidon
of Calef's Battery, with Lt. John Calef, seen mounted to the immediate right of
the guidon and directly behind the artillery piece in the left foreground. The officer
directly to the left of Reynolds is Capt. Miles Keogh, one of Buford's aides,
who would eventually die at the Little Big Horn, under Custer.
The title of the painting is based on the
actual words of Brigadier General Buford to Major General Reynolds when asked,
"What's the matter, John?" plans.
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